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THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
THE "FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE" OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
There has been much discussion among members of the
bar as to the interpretation which has been given the "Full
Faith and Credit Clause" of our national constitution, but the
question seems to have been the subject matter of compara-
tively little judicial discussion. Yet along with a goodly
number of other such problems which have never come up for a
really exhaustive survey by the courts, it is one of which we
would all like to have such slight information as there is.
Before beginning the bodily discussion of the "clause" we
present it in the succeeding paragraph, in order that we may
see how our own personal interpretation of it; as we will gain
that interpretation from its construction and content; differs
from the construction which has been given it by the courts.
Article 4, Sec. 1 of the United States Constitution: Full
Faith and Credit shall be given in each state to the public
acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state.
And the Congress made by general laws prescribed the manner
in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved,
and the effect thereof."'
On reading the clause we would almost unanimously hold
that it means domestic judgments shall be executory force
in foreign states. And we would not be without good author-
ity backing us in such a view. Yet no court has perhaps ever
given recognition or held to such a construction. The judges
seem to have done with it that which has been done with so
many other parts of the constitution; namely, they have
construed it with the idea of adapting it to the best practical
needs of the country, and not with any idea in mind as giving
it a didactic literal interpretation.
The very early cases on the subject did have a very strong
1. An Act of Congress, May 26, 1790, 1 stat. 122, to all practical pur-
poses merely confirmed the "full ia~th and credit" clause. It has no special
bear.n- in this discussion and will receive no separate attention.
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tendency toward a literal and parenthetical interpretation of
the clause. It is said, (although contemporaneous authority
cannot be found on the subject,) that Chief Justice Marshall
was the only judge of his court who held that a foreign state
judgment was not of conclusive effect. But few cases arose
on the subject in those days on national construction, perhaps
due to the small amount of interstate commerce and travel;
but of those early cases perhaps D 'Arcy v. Ketchum 2 is
the most important. In that case probably originated much
of the present day legal construction given to the clause.
There the court held that a foreign state judgment did not
preclude an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court, not of the
right of the state over the person or subject matter. This
decision started the present day line of thought and since that
time the trend has steadily been to question foreign state
judgments more and more, and so has the tendency been down
until the present day.
Of all the text book writers who have given thought on
the subject, the courts seem to have given Story3 the greatest.
preference in the matter of quotations. The author prefers
Black4 as he is more modern (1910). Both Story and Black
have written good discussions and furnished good references
on the subject. Largely drawn from the two authors above
mentioned; although much has been gathered from other texts
and the original sources; there is below in condensed form the
author's conception of the present day interpretation given to
the clause.
First, a judgment rendered in one state, by a court having
jurisdiction over both parties and subject matter, is conclu-
sive on its merits in every other state, when used as a cause
of actiop, and in the event of such an action an inquiry into
the merits is not allowable.
Secondly, a judgment valid at home, to become of executory
effect in another state, must be used as a cause for a new
2. 11th of Howard, 165.
3. Story-Commentaries on Constitutional Law; Story-Conflict of Laws.
4. Black-Constitutional Law.
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action in that state, and must be merged in a new domestic
judgment.
Thirdly, the priority, privilege and lien accorded to domes-
tic judgments is not accorded to foreign judgments. Only
.uch powers as are given by the lex fori are accorded them.
And fourthly, a foreign state judgment is only either a
sound basis of prima facie evidence for a new suit. Text
authors conflict as to its exact status in a domestic court,0
although judges seem to have paid even less attention to this
phase, comparatively speaking, than they have the general
subject, probably due to the fact that whether such a judgment
operates as a highly meritably basis or merely as a best
grade of prima facie evidence for a suit, the court proceedings
would be practically the same.
There are several defenses as against a foreign judgment.
As before said the tendency to question them has become
steadily stronger, so that today there are several pleadings
permissible against them. They are:
First-Plea to the jurisdiction of the court. This may be
carried out as regards the authority of the preceding court
over the person, or of its power over the subject matter. It
may be used in cases of judgments in personem; as where the
court has failed to obtain jurisdiction over the person as by
improper service, etc.), and it will also be a defense, as against
a foreign court's judgment which if extended would be of
extra territorial effect.
Secondly-The defendant may show that the judgment
has been set aside or reversed by an appellate court.
Thirdly-If the statute of limitations runs as to judgments
in the state wherein the foreign decree is being considered
it will constitute a valid defense.
5. In Dwyer's "Cases on Private International Law," and in Rorer on
"American Interstate Law," it is spoken of as mere prima facie evidence;
while both Story and Black, referred to supra, hold that it Is conclusive on
Its merits.
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Fourthly--The defendant may show cause in some cases.
Both authors and judges disagree as to the admissibility of
it as a defense, some holding that it may not be plead be-
cause the party who desires to avoid a judgment on such
grounds has had his opportunity in the court which rendered
the judgment, and that therefore he may be considered to
have waived it; while others hold that fraud is at all times a
defense; and may be raised accordingly.
From the above paragraphs it may be seen that the "full
faith and credit" clause of the United States Constitution has
anything but a strict interpretation, yet in spite of the conflict-
ing authority as to minor points in its construction, the
courts have been almost unanimous in their views as to the
main subject matter, and have worked out, or are working
out, what is perhaps the best possible solution of the problem.
LAFAYETTE J. HAINES, JR., '23.
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